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Comment
E-MAIL IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
I. INTRODUCTION
The foundation for the modern right of privacy traces its origins to
the influential Harvard Law Review article coauthored by Samuel D. War-
ren and Louis D. Brandeis in 1890.1 These authors proclaimed: "Recent
inventions and business methods call attention to the next step which
must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the
individual... the right 'to be let alone.' 2 Warren and Brandeis realized
that society was in a perpetual state of advancement; consequently, the
American legal system also had to evolve perpetually to protect the individ-
ual's privacy rights. 3 At the turn of the century, however, the article was
met with mixed reaction. Numerous courts rejected the right to privacy
because past American courts had never recognized such a right.4 Con-
versely, a minority of courts embraced the right to privacy thesis set forth
in the article. 5 Currently, the right of privacy is firmly entrenched within
the American legal system. 6
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv.
193 (1890). Professor Richard C. Turkington commented on the legal signifi-
cance of the Warren and Brandeis article:
It is likely that the Warren and Brandeis article has had as much impact
on the development of law as any single publication in legal periodicals.
It is certainly one of the most commented upon and cited publications in
the history of our legal system. A more influential piece of scholarship is
difficult to imagine.... The official theory of the legal right of privacy as
expressed in numerous publications springs the right eo instanti from the
pen of Warren and Brandeis in 1890.
RicHARD C. TURKINGTON ET AL., PIUVACY: CASES AND MATERIALS 31 (1992).
2. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
3. See id. Warren and Brandeis authored their article in response to the mass
media's "overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency." Id. at 196. The technology of the 1890s that Warren and Brandeis felt
presented a danger to privacy interests included "[i]nstantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise [that] have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices [that] threaten to make good the
prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops.'" Id. at 195.
4. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902)
(rejecting right to privacy because not historically based and deferring to legisla-
ture's power to create right to privacy).
5. See Pavesich v. New England Ins., Co., 50 S.E. 68, 72 (Ga. 1905) ("A right to
privacy in matters purely private is ... derived from natural law.").
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing consti-
tutional right to privacy). In Griswold, the Court recognized that a right to privacy
exists under the U.S. Constitution even though the right to privacy is not expressly
mentioned in the Constitution. See id. at 484. Justice Douglas, writing for the ma-
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In today's ever increasing computerized world, the potential danger
to individual privacy interests exists at a level never before seen.7 The
workplace presents a unique arena for privacy analysis. Two competing
interests exist in the employment context: the employer's right to conduct
business in a self-determined manner is matched against the employee's
privacy interests or the right to be let alone. 8
This Comment analyzes an employee's privacy interests relating to
electronic mail ("e-mail") in the workplace. Part II discusses the basic is-
sues that exist when an employer decides to install and maintain an e-mail
system in the workplace. 9 Part III discusses the sources of law for privacy
rights in the employment context: the United States Constitution, individ-
ual state constitutions, the common law and federal statutory enact-
ments. 10 Part IV discusses two recent federal district court cases and one
state court case involving e-mail privacy in the workplace." Part V dis-
cusses e-mail employment policies as a possible method to alleviate the
privacy concerns of both employers and employees. 12 In addition, Part V
provides segments of a sample e-mail employment policy covering the ma-
jority, stated that specific guarantees within the Bill of Rights have penumbras
"formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and sub-
stance." Id. The guarantees within the Bill of Rights that create a constitutional
zone of privacy are the First Amendment's right of association, the Third Amend-
ment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment's right
against self-incrimination and the Ninth Amendment's retention of rights not spe-
cifically enumerated within the Constitution. See id. The Court concluded that
"the right of privacy which presses for recognition [in this case] is a legitimate
one." Id. at 485. For a further discussion of the impact of Warren and Brandeis on
privacy law in the United States, see Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A
Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 703 (1990); Robert C. Post,
Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 647 (1991).
7. See EDwARD A. CAvAzos & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAw: YOUR
RiGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD 14 (1994) (noting immense increase in
e-mail use over last three years); Ken Wasch, Encouraging E-mail, Limiting Liability,
Bus. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1996, at 13 ("E-mail is changing the workplace in a way we
have not seen since the proliferation of the telephone a century ago."); see also
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (discussing recent issue of commercial enterprises distributing unsolicited e-
mail advertising to subscribers). For a general discussion of invasion of privacy
and the private sector workplace, see John D. Blackburn et al., Invasion of Privacy:
Refocusing the Tort in Private Sector Employment, 6 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 41 (1993).
8. See Julie A. Flanagan, Note, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private
Workplace, 43 DUKE LJ. 1256, 1257 (1994) (stating that employers see monitoring
as "an unrestricted prerogative of management while labor views it as a step to-
wards an Orwellian workplace").
9. For a further discussion of the basic issues presented by e-mail in the work-
place, see infra notes 15-34 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the sources of privacy protection, see infra
notes 35-93 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of recent case law involving e-mail in the work-
place, see infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of e-mail employment policies as a method to
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jor areas of concern for e-mail privacy in the workplace.13 Part VI con-
cludes that, under current federal and state law, an 'employee has limited
privacy rights for workplace e-mail and that e-mail monitoring policies
should be instituted in all workplaces utilizing an e-mail system.1
4
II. ISSUEs REGARDING E-MAIL IN THE WORKPLACE
Approximately twenty million employees have access to e-mail systems
in their workplaces.15 Because of the need for advanced communications
in the business world, this figure is expected to double by the year 2000.16
E-mail communication provides employers and employees with a techno-
logical advantage in the modem workplace.1 7 Along with its many bene-
fits, employers have started to realize that the use of e-mail technology may
also have complicated drawbacks. 18
prevent privacy conflicts between employers and employees, see infra notes 12148
and accompanying text.
13. For an example of a sample e-mail employment policy, see infra notes 137-
41 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the conclusion of this Comment, see infra
notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
15. See Lisa Donovan, E-mail, Privacy Don't Mix: Employees Mistaken to Assume
Protection, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1996, at B5. This figure represents ap-
proximately one-sixth of the total work force in the United States. See Karen Brune
Mathis, Eyes on Your E-Mail; Messages Workers Send on Company Computers Are Often
Monitored, FLA. TIMES-UNION, July 15, 1996, at 10. Ninety percent of companies
with greater than 1000 employees utilize e-mail systems. See id. In addition,
greater than 50% of company e-mail systems have originated since 1990. See id.
One large American company estimates that its employees transmit greater than
one million e-mail messages across company networks every day. See Bonnie C.
Glassberg et al., Electronic Communication: An Ounce of Policy is Worth a Pound of Cure;
Electronic Mail Bus. HoIzoNs, July 1996, at 74 (discussing DuPont's use of e-mail
systems).
16. See Holland & Hart, E-mail and Voice Mail: Liability Waiting to Happen?,
IDAHO EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER, July 1996, at 1. According to Frank Morris Jr., a
Washington, D.C. attorney, in the year 2000, the estimated forty million workplace
e-mail users will generate sixty billion e-mail messages a year. See Mathis, supra
note 15, at 10. In addition, a Massachusetts-based research company has estimated
that e-mail use in the United States will increase from 15% to 50% of the total
population by the year 2002. See Vanessa Houlder, Failing to Get the Message: E-
mail'v Advantages Could Be Lost By Staff Misusing It, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 17,
1997, at 14.
17. See Holland & Hart, supra note 16, at 1. E-mail allows employees and em-
ployers to communicate in a more efficient manner, thus saving.both time and
money. See id. In a very brief period of time, an e-mail user can communicate with
another individual anywhere in the world. See id. In addition, an employer's cli-
ents often demand and prefer services that involve e-mail technology. See id.; see
also Mark Calvey, Electronic Communications Giving Companies a Shock, S.F. Bus.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at All ("[C] ompanies want employees to harness the ability of
e-mail to keep in touch with colleagues, customers and suppliers day or night
around the world. They are also attracted by the awesome informational capabili-
ties of the Internet."); Donovan, supra note 15, at B5 (stating that e-mail is
"[m]eant to increase on-the-job productivity").
18. See Beth Mattson, E-mail Messages Carry Legal Pitfalls, Bus. DATELINE, Dec.
1997] COMMENT 1013
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First, e-mail communications can be discoverable evidence during a
civil or criminal proceeding against an employer. 19 E-mail communica-
20, 1996, at 16 ("[A]s e-mail becomes more prevalent in today's workplace, so do
the problems that result from the misuse and abuse of this communication me-
dium."). Unlike paper, e-mail can be copied and communicated to others with
much greater ease. See Michael Overly, Avoid the Legal Pitfalls of E-mail, LAN MAG.,
Jan. 1997, at 75 ("With the click of a mouse, an employee can send e-mail to every
computer user in a company or post the e-mail on the Internet where thousands, if
not hundreds of thousands, of people can read it."). One group of commentators
created a list of the differences between e-mail and traditional communications
medium. See Glassberg et al., supra note 15, at 74 fig.1. The list includes the fol-
lowing differences: "[vjerbal and visual cues are filtered out and references to sta-
tus or position are lacking," "[ciopies of messages look the same as the originals,"
"[t]he store-and-forward system results in one or more copies being stored as back-
ups," "[d]eleting your copy does not mean all copies are destroyed," "[m]essages,
once opened, cannot be retrieved, and can be edited and forwarded without the
original sender's knowledge or consent" and "[m]essages are not protected in the
same way as letters; they are considered the property of the owner of the network,
usually the employer." Id.
In addition to e-mail-specific issues, employers are also worried about employ-
ees using the Internet for personal use during work hours. Recently, software
manufacturers created software programs that make it easy for an employer "to
monitor every Internet transaction made from [the employee's] computer." Is the
Boss Watching You Surf the Web?, DES MOINES REG., May 21, 1996, at 3.
19. See Ellen Forman, That Office E-mail You Deleted Could End Up in Court, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Mar. 25, 1997, at IA ("[I]f you're an employer, E-mail
can be subpoenaed by a plaintiff's lawyer and dragged out of the computer in case
of a lawsuit."); Mathis, supra note 15, at 10 ("[E]-mail creates a permanent record
of what's said, providing evidence in criminal and civil suits. The 'delete' key
doesn't erase the message from back-up files."); Mattson, supra note 18, at 16
("'People don't understand the permanency or potential permanency in e-mail
.... I Deleted messages may disappear from the monitor, but until the computer
writes over the space on the hard drive, the message can still be resurrected" (quot-
ing Paul Hattouni, manager of consulting services agency)); see also Glassberg et
al., supra note 15, at 74 ("Employers ... have been asked by the courts to deliver
potentially damaging evidence from corporate archives. The content of E-mail
messages might potentially be used by either party in a lawsuit. So there can be
serious legal consequences for the firm in simply storing messages on a long-term
basis."); Mattson, supra note 18, at 16 (discussing court order requiring company
to search through thirty million discarded e-mail messages for evidence of dis-
puted contract, at cost of $50,000). Furthermore, e-mail presents three significant
problems for a company defending a lawsuit: first, e-mail is easier to alter than a
handwritten document; second, requests for e-mail production can be "onerous";
and third, e-mail messages may be inadvertently preserved for numerous years. See
Patrick Mitchell, Following the E-mail Trail, COMPUTER SHOPPER, Apr. 1997, at 92.
E-mail messages are both troublesome and damaging in litigation because
they are a "hybrid written memo and telephone conversation." Mathis, supra note
15, at 13. Employees often spend little time drafting or revising e-mail messages, as
evidenced by their tendency to be "short, punchy, poorly punctuated-and poten-
tially harmful." Id.; see also Houlder, supra note 16, at 14 (stating that survey of 259
United Kingdom organizations found "widespread carelessness in the way that e-
mails were structured and distributed"). Attorneys refer to such uncensored e-mail
messages as being "'hot documents' because such potentially incriminating state-
ments can provide an opening to possible liability and litigation." L.A. Lorek, E-
mail Can Get the Employer in Trouble, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale),Jan. 12, 1997,
at G4. For further examples of litigation involving e-mail communications in the
1014 [Vol. 42: p. 1011
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tions are subject to the same discovery standards as paper-based communi-
cations, such as letters or memoranda.2 0 In addition to being discoverable
evidence, the contents of workplace e-mail may be the primary reason an
employer is being sued. 2 1 For example, in the first reported case in which
e-mail was the basis for an employment discrimination claim, two employ-
ees filed a racial discrimination lawsuit against their employer, Morgan
Stanley, for sixty-million dollars after they received racially offensive mate-
rial via e-mail from coworkers. 22 Although Morgan Stanley took what it
termed "swift and stern action" after learning of the incident, the two em-
ployees sought recovery because the messages created a "hostile work envi-
ronment," causing them to experience severe emotional and physical
distress.2 3 Similarly, employees of Citibank recently filed a suit in the
workplace, see Geanne Rosenberg, Electronic Discovery Proves an Effective Legal
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at D5.
E-mail communications are becoming a particular concern in the health serv-
ices industry. See Jeffrey A. Van Doren, If You Monitor E-mail, Have a Policy, HEALTH
CARE SUPERVISOR, Sept. 1996, at 12 ("Use of electronic mail . . . in health care
institutions is a new cause for concern in monitoring confidentiality."). If an em-
ployee transmits an e-mail message violating the employer's patient confidentiality
policy, the employer could be held liable and "the e-mail communication could be
the proverbial smoking gun." Id. In addition, the use of e-mail communications in
law firms is raising new issues. For a thorough discussion of the attorney-client
privilege and the use of e-mail communications in the legal setting, see William P.
Matthews, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, the Internet, and the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 285-95 (1996).
20. See Mitchell, supra note 19, at 92 (quoting Professor John Wiley of Univer-
sity of California at Los Angeles School of Law as stating that "[e]-mail is a rich
source of information in lawsuits .... [and] is a window into the internal working
of an organization"); The Hidden Risks of E-Mail, AM. LAW., Apr. 1996, at 109 ("'The
basic rule is that electronic information is subject to discovery to the same extent
and with the same general limits relating to relevance, privilege, and burden that
paper-based information is.'" (quoting Michael Patrick, Partner, Fenwick &
West)).
21. See Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5928 (SWK), 1995 WL 326492,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (finding executive's e-mails were relevant evidence in
sexual discrimination suit).
22. See Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 Civ. 9747 (DLC), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10351, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1997) (granting defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' employment discrimination and state law contract and negligent
hiring claims); Susan Harrigan, Workers File Bias Lawsuit Over E-Mail at Brokerage
House, NEWSDAY, Jan. 14, 1997, at A41; The CAW Computer Connection (CNN televi-
sion broadcast, Jan. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Computer Connection]. According to the
plaintiff's attorney, Howard Shafran, the e-mail "purported to be a 'homework as-
signment' by 'Leroy,' a public-school ninth-grader who misuses a number of words
in an obscene manner apparently intended to mock [African-American] street
slang." Harrigan, supra, at A41. In addition, the complaint filed in a United States
District Court in Manhattan, New York seeks to be certified as a class action suit for
all African-American employees at Morgan Stanley. See id.
23. See Harrigan, supra note 22, at A41; Computer Connection, supra note 22.
Once Morgan Stanley executives were notified of the complaint, they took strong
action against the six employees who distributed the message, which included re-
voking supervisory responsibilities. See Harrigan, supra note 22, at A41; Computer
Connection, supra note 22. Shortly after the filing of the complaint, Morgan Stanley
1997] COMMENT 1015
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United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.24
Second, employees often allege that their privacy rights have been
violated when employers monitor their workplace e-mail communica-
tions. 25 A 1993 study found that twenty-two percent of employers
searched employees' "computer files, voice mail, electronic mail, or other
networking communications." 26 A more recent study found that thirty
percent of 538 business executives polled admitted to randomly monitor-
issued a statement asserting that it "does not and will not tolerate any form of
discrimination or harassment." Harrigan, supra note 22, at A41. Furthermore, a
Morgan Stanley spokesperson stated that the firm's code of conduct specifically
prohibits the workplace distribution of materials "containing inappropriate and
offensive content," but the large size of the firm severely hampers its ability to
monitor e-mail for strict compliance. Id. For a further discussion of situations
involving e-mail messages causing companies litigation troubles, see Overly, supra
note 18, at 75.
24. See Racial, Ethnic Jokes Sent By E-mail Prompt Class Action Against Citibank,
DAILY LAB. REP., Feb. 26, 1997, at 38. In the complaint, two African-American Ci-
tibank employees alleged that Caucasian supervisors disseminated "vulgar and ra-
cially vile messages that demeaned and ridiculed African-American people." Id.
Although no African-American employees received the racially offensive messages,
the plaintiffs alleged that Citibank executives failed to take appropriate action
once they were informed about the messages, thereby allowing a "pervasively abu-
sive racially hostile work environment." Id. Citicorp, the corporate parent of Ci-
tibank, made a statement shortly after the suit was filed in federal court asserting
that it had investigated the incident the day after learning about the e-mail com-
munications. See id. Citicorp claimed it had taken disciplinary actions against the
four Citibank employees who had distributed the e-mail; one employee was termi-
nated, a former employee had his benefits suspended and the other two employees
were suspended without pay for one month. See id. Furthermore, the company
stated that "'[t]his specific E-mail is clearly contrary to Citicorp's stated and
broadly communicated policies about use of E-mail and about providing for a
workplace that is respectful of all employees.'" Id. (quoting Citicorp's February 21,
1997 statement); see also Louise Branson, Lawsuits Show It's Not as Private as You May
Think, THE STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Mar. 22, 1997, at 6 (stating that Morgan
Stanley and Citibank lawsuits will "unleash an avalanche of cases using as evidence
e-mail its senders had assumed [was] deleted"); Chrisena Coleman, Postal Worker
Hit Over Racist E-mail, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 22, 1997, at 8 (discussing sus-
pension of United States Postal Service supervisor for circulating racist e-mail on
Postal Service computer systems). For a further discussion of racial, ethnic or gen-
der discrimination lawsuits involving e-mail communications in the workplace, see
Michelle Singletary, E-Mail Humor: Punch Lines Can Carry Prices;Jokes Open Employers
to Discrimination Suits, WASH. PosT, Mar. 18, 1997, at Al (quoting Stephen L.
Sheinfeld, a New York City labor and employment attorney with Whitman, Breed,
Abbott & Morgan, as stating that "[c] laimants are now searching the e-mail systems
looking for smoking guns and because e-mail is unerasable, it can come back to
haunt an employer").
25. See Donovan, supra note 15, at B5 ("Many people make the mistake of
thinking office e-mail is as private as U.S. mail."); see also Mathis, supra note 15, at
10 ("Privacy advocates contend that e-mail monitoring creates a stressful
workplace.").
26. Andrea Bernstein, Who's Reading Your E-mail?, NEWSDAY, July 15, 1996, at
A21. This survey concluded that roughly "20 million American employees may be
subject to electronic monitoring through their computers." Id. But see Calvey,
supra note 17, at All ("[S]ome attorneys are discouraging companies from the
widespread practice of monitoring employees' e-mail.").
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ing their employees' e-mail communications. 27 Although employees and
privacy rights advocates often claim employers overstep the bounds of al-
lowable intrusions, employers often have legitimate business reasons for
monitoring workplace e-mail communications.2 8 To combat invasion of
privacy, employees may be tempted to encrypt their e-mail messages.
29
This practice, however, may make an employer suspicious as to what the
employee is sending over the e-mail system.30 As one commentator re-
cently stated in quite simple terms: "Never expect privacy for E-mail sent
through a company [computer] system." 3 1
Finally, another area for concern in the modern workplace is e-mail
communications to and from a corporation's in-house counsel.3 2 The
scope and protection of the attorney-client privilege when dealing with an
in-house counsel's e-mail communications is less than one might believe. 3
3
Such communications will be protected from discovery requests only if the
communication is "clearly part of rendering legal advice."
3 4
27. See Liz Halloran, Big Brother Is Reading This; Your Boss Can Browse Your E-
mai HARTFoRD CouRATr, Apr. 15, 1996, at Al. The Society for Human Resource
Management, based in Virginia, conducted the poll. See id.
28. See Employers Stepping Up Monitoring in Workplace (CNN television broad-
cast, Sept. 1, 1996) (interviewing employers who suggest reasons to monitor e-mail
of employees) [hereinafter Employers Stepping Up]. Hal Coxson, a Washington,
D.C. attorney, cited four examples justifying employer monitoring of employees in
the workplace in general: first, to monitor "employee performance-productivity,
quality of work, [and] customer satisfaction;" second, to monitor for employee
misconduct such as "theft .... drugs, gambling, [and] misuse of company property
for disclosure of confidential material;" third, to protect employee safety and
health; and fourth, to reduce "employer reliability for employee's acts." Id. Addi-
tionally, within the health services industry, employers have started to monitor
their employees' e-mail messages for three reasons: to reveal improper use of the
company's e-mail system, to prevent the disclosure of potentially damaging confi-
dential patient information and to aid in evaluating employee productivity. See
Van Doren, supra note 19, at 12. For a further discussion of legitimate reasons for
an employer to monitor employee e-mail communications, see infra notes 76-87
and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of encryption, see Dorothy E. Denning & William
E. Baugh, Jr., Key Escrow Encryption Policies and Technologies, 41 VILL. L. REv. 289
(1996).
30. See Eryn Brown, The Myth of E-mail Privacy, FORTUNE, Feb. 3, 1997, at 66.
One employee stated that after an employer began monitoring workplace e-mail,
"I was afraid that if I merely sent an encrypted letter, they'd think I was up to
something bad." Id.
31. Id.
32. See The Hidden Risks of E-Mail; supra note 20, at 109 (stating that in-house
counsel can act in many different capacities when sending e-mail and, thus, may or
may not be protected by attorney-client privilege).
33. See id. Michael Patrick, a partner at Fenwick & West, believes that a corpo-
ration's in-house counsel acts in two capacities, both as a lawyer and a business
executive. See id. While acting in these two capacities, in-house counsel can com-
municate over an e-mail system without distinguishing between his or her official
functions. See id. Mr. Patrick also warns that judges often construe the attorney-
client privilege narrowly so as to not "impede the search for truth." Id.
34. Id. Mr. Patrick also suggests that in-house counsel should mark all docu-
19971 1017COMMENT
7
Baum: E-mail in the Workplace and the Right of Privacy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
III. SOURCES OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
A. The United States Constitution
In 1965, the United States Supreme Court recognized a constitutional
right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.35 The Constitution, however,
protects an individual's privacy rights only from governmental intru-
sions.3 6 Therefore, the United States Constitution does not offer protec-
tion to employees from the actions of private employers.3
7
B. State Constitutions
Many state constitutions specifically offer privacy protection similar to
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unlawful searches and
seizures.3 8 Additionally, nine states explicitly guarantee the right to pri-
vacy within their constitutions.3 9 Like the Federal Constitution, eight of
ments "confidential, and attorney-client privileged communication." Id. This at-
tempt to ensure privacy, however, can be ineffective because "the privilege can be
waived if the message gets forwarded to people inside the company ... or to out-
siders." Id. Even though the label does not legally create a privileged document, it
does serve two purposes: first, to alert recipients of the communication that this
communication should be treated appropriately and, second, to notify those con-
ducting a document review "to identify and not produce those messages that are
from counsel and are subject to a claim of privilege." Id.
35. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For a further discussion of Griswold, see supra note 6
and accompanying text.
36. See Flanagan, supra note 8, at 1264-65 ("The Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution protects individual privacy from government intrusion. Hence,
the protection of the Constitution extends only to public employees; private em-
ployer behavior toward employees is not restricted." (footnote omitted)).
37. See Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.
Okla. 1978) (refusing to extend Fourth Amendment privacy protection to em-
ployee in private workplace), affd, 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1979).
38. See Flanagan, supra note 8, at 1265 ("Most states have a constitutional pro-
vision that reflects the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment regarding search
and seizure.").
39. See ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recog-
nized and shall not be infringed."); ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.");
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are.., pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy."); FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as other-
wise provided herein."); HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The light of the people to pri-
vacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this
right."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches,
seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means."); LA. CONsT. art. I, § 5 ("Every person shall be secure in
his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy .... Any person adversely af-
fected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
1018 [Vol. 42: p. 1011
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the nine states that recognize the right to privacy in their state constitu-
tions limit its protection to public employees. 40 Of the nine states, only
California extends constitutional privacy rights to both public and private
employees. 41 The California Superior Court, in Flanagan v. Epson
America,4 2 however, refused to extend California's constitutional right to
privacy to a private employee's e-mail communications. 43 The California
court suggested that the extension of constitutional privacy rights was
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court."); MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 10
("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."); WASH.
CONsT. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law."); see also State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920, 932
(Alaska Ct. App. 1992) ("Our constitutional right to privacy finds no express coun-
terpart in the federal constitution and has thus served as the basis for extending
protections to Alaska citizens that are not extended under the United States Con-
stitution."), affd, 835 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993); State v. Baldwin, 908 P.2d 484, 489
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("The Arizona Constitution, unlike the United States Consti-
tution, gives explicit protection to privacy."); Wallace v. Guzman, 687 So.2d 1351,
1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("The people have spoken" in creating right to
privacy within Florida Constitution.); Hawaii Org. of Police Officers v. Society of
Prof'lJournalists, 927 P.2d 386, 405 (Haw. 1996) ("'By amending the Constitution
to include a separate and distinct privacy right, it is the intent of [the legislature]
to insure that privacy is treated as a fundamental right for purposes of constitu-
tional analysis.'" (quoting committee reports to constitutional convention of Ha-
waii)); People v. Carter, 672 N.E.2d 1279, 1285 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (stating "that
the Illinois Constitution offers greater protection against the invasion of an indi-
vidual's privacy rights than does the Federal Constitution"); State v. Davis, 684
So.2d 540, 540 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("Louisiana Constitution affords greater protec-
tion for freedom from invasion than the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution does and that we, therefore, are not bound by federal jurispru-
dence."); John Sanchez, Constitutional Privacy in Florida: Between the Idea and the
Reality Falls the Shadow, 18 NOVA L. REV. 775, 778 (1994) (discussing Florida's con-
stitutional right to privacy); Timothy Stallcup, The Arizona Constitutional "Right to
Privacy" and the Invasion of Privacy Tort, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 687, 690 (1992) (discussing
Arizona's constitutional right to privacy).
40. See Flanagan, supra note 8, at 1265.
41. See Porten v. University of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Ct. App. 1976)
("Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inaliena-
ble right which may not be violated by anyone."). In California, an employer must
show that he or she has a compelling interest to overcome an employee's reason-
able expectation of privacy. See White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234-35 (Cal. 1975)
(holding employee had constitutional privacy claim against employer who could
not prove compelling interest); Luck v. Southern Pac. Trans. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr.
618, 632 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding private train company did not prove compelling
interest for drug testing). For a further discussion of state constitutional privacy
protection, see Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-mail:
Protecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAw. 923, 943-45 (1992).
42. No. BC007036 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1991). For a discussion of the
Flanagan case, see Frank C. Morris et al., Issues from the Electronic Workplace and E-
mail Communication: The Developing Employment Law Nightmare, SB07 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
335, 341 (1996).
43. See Morris et al., supra note 42, at 343. The court further rejected the
employer's contention that federal wiretap statutes preempted a private em-
ployee's state constitution-based privacy claim. See id. For a further discussion of
federal wiretap statutes, see infra notes 54-93 and accompanying text.
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within the province of the California legislature, not the California
judiciary.4 4
C. Common Law
An employee could successfully bring a common law cause of action
against a private employer when the employer obtains access to the em-
ployee's workplace e-mail. There are two common law causes of action in
this situation: the privacy tort of intrusion upon seclusion and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
First, the employee may bring an invasion of privacy cause of action
against the employer for intrusion upon seclusion. 45 The intrusion upon
seclusion tort is defined as follows: "One who intentionally intrudes, physi-
cally or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son."46 If an employee is to succeed in bringing this action, he or she has
to prove that an employer's access to the e-mail communications was a
"highly offensive [intrusion] to a reasonable person."4 7 One commenta-
tor has stated that "if [an] employer obtains information about [the em-
ployee] through the employer's ... computer system . . .[the employee]
will have much greater difficulty in winning a[n invasion of privacy] law-
suit."48 As a result, an employee usually does not succeed when bringing
44. See Morris et al., supra note 42, at 343.
45. See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., WORKPLACE TORTS: RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES 202(1991). In 1960, Dean William L. Prosser set forth the intrusion upon seclusion
tort as one of four right to privacy torts. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REv. 383, 389 (1960) (describing tort as "[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs"). Dean Prosser's four privacy torts, intrusion
upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light and appropriation,
were later incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See TURKINGTON ET
AL., supra note 1, at 49; see also Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the
Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 671 (1996) ("Two well-established
common law doctrines increasingly are coming into conflict. The first protects
individuals from unreasonable intrusions on their privacy. The second authorizes
an employer to fire its employees at will, unless a clear agreement exists to the
contrary.").
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965). One must also establish
that the "subjective expectation of privacy" was "objectively reasonable." PERuTr,
supra note 45, at 203. Consequently, the individual must show a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy "tested by outward manifestations that the claimant expected the
information to remain private." Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
48. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., YOUR RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE 140 (1993). In
addition, Flanagan stated that an employee must overcome three major obstacles
to be successful in an intrusion upon seclusion tort claim. See Flanagan, supra note
8, at 1267. First, the employee must show that the workplace is a "sufficiently pri-
vate atmosphere." Id. Second, the employee must prove that the e-mail intrusion
was highly objectionable to the reasonable person. See id. Third, the employee
must contend with jurisdictions that require the publication of the information
learned during the privacy intrusion. See id. But see Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449
1020 [Vol. 42: p. 1011
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an intrusion upon seclusion claim against his or her employer for e-mail
monitoring.
49
Second, an employee may bring a claim against his or her employer
for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from e-mail moni-
toring in the workplace. 50 In defining the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "[o] ne who
by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes se-
vere emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to another results from it, for such bodily
harm."5 1 Although this tort could be available to an employee, it is un-
likely that a court would characterize an employer's access to an em-
ployee's e-mail to be "extreme and outrageous conduct."5 2 Therefore,
except in the most "extreme and outrageous" circumstances, an em-
ployee's intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action would
most likely fail.
53
D. Federal Statutory Enactments
1. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986
The United States Congress enacted the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) 5 4 to amend the technologically antiquated Ti-
tle III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("OCC-
SSA").55 Congress realized that the existing laws protecting business and
F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that publication is not necessary element of
intrusion upon seclusion).
49. See Flanagan, supra note 8, at 1267 ("The combination of these require-
ments typically defeats the employee's tort claim."). For a discussion of a recent
federal district court case decided under the intrusion upon seclusion tort frame-
work, see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
50. See Flanagan, supra note 8, at 1267 n.82 ("An employee might claim that
the employer's violation of privacy constitutes the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress rather than invasion of privacy.").
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. Dean Prosser further defined the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as follows: "[T]he rule which
seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct exceeding all bounds
usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to
cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind." WILLIAM PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS 56 (4th ed. 1971).
52. See Flanagan, supra note 8, at 1267 n.82 ("[T]he employer's conduct must
be extreme in degree, outrageous in character, and 'atrocious, and utterly intoler-
able in a civilized community."' (quoting Kaminski v. United Parcel Serv., 501
N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (App. Div. 1986))).
53. See Blackburn et al., supra note 7, at 56 n.54 (stating that emotional dis-
tress tort "places severe restrictions to recovery upon an employee whose privacy
has been invaded" and is usually unhelpful in workplace privacy suit).
54. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.).
55. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994). The United States Congress enacted Title
III of the OCCSSA in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted
in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. In Berger, the Supreme Court, for the first time, pro-
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personal communications had "not kept pace with the development of
communications and computer technology. Nor [had the laws] kept pace
with changes in the structure of the telecommunications industry."56 In
amending Title III of the OCCSSA, Congress sought to "bring it in line
with technological developments and changes in the structure of the tele-
communications industry."5 7 In its discussion of technological advance-
ments, Congress specifically mentioned that e-mail required additional
protection.5
8
tected oral conversations from electronic eavesdropping under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-64.
56. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2. The Senate Report to the ECPA ("Senate
Report") also acknowledged that since the enactment of the Constitution, "devel-
opment of new methods of communication and devices for surveillance [had] ex-
panded dramatically the opportunity for ... intrusions" into Fourth Amendment
protected areas. See id. at 1-2. In addition, Senator Patrick Leahy, a sponsor of the
ECPA, stated that Title III of the OCCSSA was "hopelessly out of date." 132 CONG.
REc. 7992 (1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
57. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3. In recognizing the inherent risks of the techno-
logical revolution, the Senate Report stated that:
These tremendous advances in telecommunications and computer tech-
nologies have carried with them comparable technological advances in
surveillance devices and techniques. Electronic hardware making it possi-
ble for overzealous law enforcement agencies, industrial spies and private
parties to intercept the personal or proprietary communications of others
are readily available in the American market today.
Id. As a result of this concern, Congress stated that under the ECPA, "[p]rivacy
cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will gradually erode as
technology advances." Id. at 5. Furthermore, Congress felt it had to "act to pro-
tect the privacy of our citizens. If we do not, we will promote the gradual erosion
of this precious right." Id.
58. See id. at 3-4. Senator Leahy requested a determination in 1984 from the
United States Attorney General concerning the protection status of e-mail commu-
nications under the then existing Title III of the OCCSSA. See id. at 3. The De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) responded to Senator Leahy's query, and stated that
"[f]ederal law protects electronic communications against unauthorized acquisi-
tion only where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists." Id. at 4. Under this
standard, the DOJ concluded that specific legislation was required for such com-
munications because determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy ex-
ists was "not always clear or obvious." Id. In addition, in October 1985, Congress's
Office of Technology Assessment concluded in a study that e-mail protection at
that time was "weak, ambiguous, or non-existent ... [and that] electronic mail
remains legally as well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance." OF-
FICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOL-
oGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 31 (1985).
During the enactment of the ECPA, the Senate Report clearly described many
of the new telecommunications and computer technologies including electronic
mail, cellular telephones, electronic pagers and remote computer services. S. REP.
No. 99-541, at 8-10. The Senate Report described electronic mail in the following
manner:
Electronic mail is a form of communication by which private corre-
spondence is transmitted over public and private telephone lines. In its
most common form, messages are typed into a computer terminal, and
then transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient computer operated
by an electronic mail company. If the intended addressee subscribes to
the service, the message is stored by the company's computer "mail box"
1022
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a. Access to Stored E-Mail: Title II of the ECPA
The focus of analysis will be on the Stored Wire and Electronic Com-
munications and Transactional Records Access ("Stored Communications
Act")5 9 provisions, or Title II of the ECPA.60 More specifically, cases in-
volving employer access to stored e-mail messages are governed by 18
U.S.C. § 2701.61 Under § 2701, a person or entity violates the Stored
Communications Act if he or she "intentionally accesses without authoriza-
tion a facility through which an electronic communication service is pro-
vided."62 Courts must sanction a violation of the Stored Communications
Act for "commercial advantage, malicious destruction or damage, or pri-
vate commercial gain" with more severity than other violations. 63
The Stored Communications Act provides two exceptions for the ac-
cess of stored e-mail communications: the provider exception and the user
exception.6 4 First, under the provider exception, the Stored Communica-
until the subscriber calls the company to retrieve its mail, which is then
routed over the telephone system to the recipient's computer. If the ad-
dressee is not a subscriber to the service, the electronic mail company can
put the message onto paper and then deposit it in the normal postal
system.
Electronic mail systems may be available for public use or may be proprietary,
such as systems operated l private companies for internal correspondence.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1994).
60. See id. §§ 2510-2711. The Senate Report modeled this portion of the
ECPA after the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994). See
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (stating purpose was to "protect privacy interests in per-
sonal and proprietary information, while protecting the Government's legitimate
law enforcement needs"). Under amended Title III of the OCCSSA, "electronic
storage" is defined as: "(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or elec-
tronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B)
any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for
purposes of backup protection of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17).
61. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,
462-63 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that seizure of stored electronic communications
is governed by Title II of ECPA). For a further discussion of Steve Jackson Games,
see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a) (1). In addition, an individual violates the Stored
Communications Act if he or she "intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or
electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system." Id.
§ 2701 (a) (2).
63. Id. § 2701(b). If an individual is convicted of violating the Stored Com-
munications Act for the above defined purposes, the punishment is "(A) a fine
under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in the case
of a first offense... ; and (B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more
than two years, or both, for any subsequent offense." Id. § 2701(b) (1). If an indi-
vidual violates the Stored Communications Act for any other purpose, the punish-
ment is "a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both." Id. § 2701 (b) (2).
64. Id. § 2701(c). A discussion of the Stored Communications Act's third ex-
ception, the governmental access exception described within § 2701(c) (3), is be-
yond the scope of this Comment.
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tions Act does not apply to conduct authorized "by the person or entity
providing a wire or electronic communications service." 65 According to
many commentators who interpret the provider exception broadly, private
employers who maintain a computer system have the ability to peruse and
disclose employee e-mail communications without violating the Stored
Communications Act.66 Other commentators have recommended that
employers should be cautious when justifying their monitoring of e-mail
with the provider exception. 67 Some commentators warn, however, that
employers should not rely extensively on the provider exception if the em-
ployer merely provides a common carrier's e-mail service to its employ-
ees. 68 Second, under the user exception, the Stored Communications Act
65. Id. § 2701(c) (1). One commentator has noted that "it may reasonably be
contended that employers have the right to search in-house E-mail under [the
ECPA] because such communications, if limited to exchanges of employer infor-
mation, may constitute the employer's property, which the employer retains the
right to supervise." JAMES BAIRD ET AL., PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PRIvAcY: A LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ISSUES AFFECTING THE WORKPLACE 60 (1995). Other commen-
tators have determined that the ECPA provides a much greater cloak of immunity
for employers because "[c]ompany snooping and Big Brotherism is not a felony or
even a misdemeanor under the ECPA. It is entirely legal." Joanne Goode & Mag-
gie Johnson, Putting Out the Flames: The Etiquette and Law of E-Mail, ONLINE, Nov.
1991, at 61.
66. See Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail
Monitoring in the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 345, 359 (1995) (cit-
ing various commentators who support broad interpretation of Stored Communi-
cations Act's provider exception). One commentator has asserted that the Stored
Communications Act is inapplicable to employers because they are not a "third
party" accessing the stored e-mail communication. See Steven B. Winters, Do Not
Fold, Spindle or Mutilate: An Examination of Workplace Privacy in Electronic Mail, 1 S.
CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 85, 116-19 (1992). Gantt suggested that this assertion is "im-
precise because employers are 'third parties' to employee-employee communica-
tions." Gantt, supra, at 359 n.96.
67. See Baumhart, supra note 41, at 925. Baumhart contends that "to blindly
adopt the view that the [ECPA] imposes no access limitations on employers who
possess their own systems ignores Congress' stated intent to procure parity in the
protection of personal communications." Id. at 926. In addition, Baumhart stated
that by "[a]dopting [the broad interpretation] of the provisions, a 'corporate big
brother' is free to read at leisure employee E-mail messages, no matter how personal
Moreover, the employer then has almost unfettered discretion to disclose the con-
tents of a message." Id. (emphasis added). Baumhart conceded, in arguing for a
more restrictive application of the provider exception, that most of the testimony
from a Senate hearing on the ECPA "reflected an overriding concern for com-
pany, rather than individual employee privacy." Id.
68. See Gantt, supra note 66, at 360 & nn.101-02 (listing common carriers of e-
mail communications services such as Prodigy, CompuServe, AT&T Mail,
SprintMail and MCI Mail); see also Theodora R. Lee, Privacy Issues in the Workplace,
in WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS: 1996, at 411, 462 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 558, 1997) ("[E] mployers may not access messages if
the system is provided by an outside entity such as MCI Mail without the authoriza-
tion of either the employee who communicated the message or the intended re-
ceiver of the message."). But see Paul E. Hash & Christina M. Ibrahim, E-Mail,
Electronic Monitoring, and Employee Privacy, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 893, 899 (1996) (assert-
ing that "[t] he ECPA only protects messages sent over public networks such as MCI
mail, Internet, Prodigy, or CompuServe because the definition of 'electronic com-
1024
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does not apply to conduct authorized "by a user of that service with re-
spect to a communication of or intended for that user."69 One commen-
tator asserts that such authorization "may be expressly given, and in some
cases, reasonably implied from the surrounding situation."70
b. Interception of E-Mail: Tide III of the OCCSSA as Amended by
Tide I of the ECPA
The interception 71 of an e-mail communication is governed by Tide
III of the OCCSSA. 72 Through Tide I of the ECPA, Tide III of the OCC-
SSA was amended to extend interception protection to "electronic com-
munication." 73 Under 18 U.S.C. § 2511, an individual violates Tide III of
the OCCSSA if he or she "intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept,
or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral or electronic communication."74 Damages for a violation of Tide III
of the OCCSSA are more severe than damages for a violation of the Stored
Communications Act.
75
munication' . . . pertains to a communication that 'affects interstate or foreign
commerce'" (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994))). Hash and Ibrahim suggest
that the ECPA may not cover intracompany e-mail unless the employer's system
.crosses state lines or perhaps connects to an interstate network." Id. In addition,
they state that the ECPA is unclear on this point and judicial interpretation is nec-
essary to determine whether intracompany e-mail has ECPA protection. See id.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (2) (1994).
70. Sally D. Garr, Employee Monitoring in the Internet Age, SB53 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 11
(1997) (stating that standard for determining whether access was given is similar to
standard of consent under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), dealing with interception of
wire, oral or electronic communications). For a discussion on consent to e-mail
interception, see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(A) (1994) (defining interception as "the aural or
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communications
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device" (emphasis
added)).
72. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521; see Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Se-
cret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1994). For a further discussion of Steve Jackson
Games, see infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
73. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 14 (1986); see also Thomas R. Greenberg, Com-
ment, E-Mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 Am.
U. L. REv. 219, 232 n.70 (1994) ("The addition of 'electronic communication' to
Tide III opened the door for the protection of a host of modern communication
technologies not covered prior to 1986."). Prior to the passage of the ECPA, Tide
III of the OCCSSA protected "only communications capable of being heard" from
interception. BlRD ET AL., supra note 65, at 59.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
75. See Baumhart, supra note 41, at 936. If an individual's wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communication is unlawfully intercepted, he or she is entitled to "(1) such
preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be appropriate; (2)
damages ...and punitive damages in appropriate cases; and (3) a reasonable
attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b)
(1994). Damages for unlawfully intercepted electronic communications are deter-
mined as follows: a first time violator is liable for the greater of actual damages or
statutory damages, not less than $50 and not greater than $500; a two-time violator
is liable for the greater of actual damages or statutory damages, not less than $100
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Like the Stored Communications Act, Title III of the OCCSSA has
exceptions that create allowable interceptions of wire, oral or electronic
communications.76 The ordinary course of business exception is found
buried within Title III's definition section. 77 Under this exception, an em-
ployer may intercept an employee's e-mail communications in the ordi-
nary course of its business if it uses "equipment or [a] facility, or any
component thereof' furnished by the provider of the electronic communi-
cation service in the ordinary course of its business. 78
One commentator has separated cases dealing with employer liability
under the ordinary course of business exception of Title III of the OCC-
SSA into two distinct branches: "legitimate business purpose" cases and
"subject of the call" cases. 79 Cases involving the legitimate business pur-
pose exception focus upon whether the employer. had a legitimate busi-
ness purpose to justify the interception of the employee's
communication. 80 Courts have held that telephone monitoring to ensure
better quality control81 and to reduce personal use was an allowable inter-
and not greater than $1000; and any other violator is liable for the greater of "the
sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the
violator as a result of the violation" or "statutory damages of whichever is the
greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000." Id. § 2520(c).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d). Section 2520 provides three good faith defenses
to liability under Title III of the OCCSSA. See id. Section 2520(d) states that:
A good faith reliance on -
(1) a court warrant or order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative
authorization, or a statutory authorization; or
(2) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under
section 2518(7) of this tile; or
(3) a good faith determination that section 2511(3) of the title p r-
mitted the conduct complained of;
is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under this
chapter or any other law.
Id. (emphasis added).
77. See id. § 2510(5)(a) (defining "electronic, mechanical, or other device").
78. Id. Section 2510(5) (a) provides in part that:
"[E)lectronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or appara-
tus which can be used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion other than -
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any
component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider
of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its
business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of
its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the
facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business ....
Id. (emphasis added).
79. See Greenberg, supra note 73, at 239.
80. See id. When determining whether a legitimate business purpose exists, a
court must look to whether: "(1) the employer had a reasonable business justifica-
tion for the intrusion; (2) employees were provided notice of the possibility of
monitoring; and (3) the employer acted consistently with respect to the extent of
the monitoring of which employees were warned." Id. at 239 n.104.
81. SeeJames v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1979)
1026 [Vol. 42: p. 1011
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ception under Title III's ordinary course of business exception.
8 2
The "subject of the call" cases establish "the basic rule that calls relat-
ing to the business of the employer may be intercepted."83 Following this
rationale, an employer is not allowed to monitor personal telephone com-
munications, except to the extent necessary to determine whether they are
personal and not business related.
84
Under either Title III of the OCCSSA or the Stored Communications
Act, the employer may raise the defense of consent, whereby the employee
consented to either the e-mail interception or access to stored e-mail.8 5
Courts will uphold the consent defense if the employee's consent is found
to be either express or implied. 86 By proving implied consent through a
well-disseminated e-mail policy, the likelihood of an employer's liability is
decreased. 8
7
(holding that, after providing notice, employer could intercept telephone commu-
nications to help employees provide better service).
82. See Simmons v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 452 F. Supp. 392, 397 (W.D.
Okla. 1978) (holding that, after providing notice, employer could monitor tele-
phone switchboard and then discharge employee for using telephone for personal
reasons).
83. Greenberg, supra note 73, at 241.
84. See Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that per-
sonal call may be intercepted to determine its nature in ordinary course of busi-
ness); Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., 802 F.2d 412, 417 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
monitoring conversation between hospital employees was within ordinary course
of business); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that monitoring of personal calls was not in ordinary course of business);
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 630 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
employer may monitor telephone calls based upon fear of disclosure of sensitive
business information); Greenberg, supra note 73, at 241 ("[P]ersonal calls cannot
be intercepted, except to the extent necessary to determine whether or not the call
is personal.").
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) (1994).
86. See Mark J. Manta, Electronic Surveillance and Employee Privacy in the Work-
place, METROPOLITAN CORP. CoUNs., June 1996, at 16 ("The ECPA allows the inter-
ception of electronic communications where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent, express or implied, to such an intercep-
tion."); see also Gantt, supra note 66, at 356 (stating that "courts have held that
consent under the interception exception may be implied or actual, but that con-
structive consent is inadequate"). Some commentators suggest that although
courts have not yet interpreted the Stored Communication Act's consent defense
when courts are faced with the issue, they will treat it in a manner similar, if not
identical, to the consent defense in § 2511(2)(d). See id.; see also Garr, supra note
70, at 11 ("Furthermore, although the courts have not yet interpreted the consent
exception under the stored communications provisions, courts have held that con-
sent ... may be implied or actual.").
87. See Gantt, supra note 66, at 356 (stating that court in Watkins limited em-
ployee consent to confines of employer monitoring policy). For a further discus-
sion of e-mail policies in the workplace and their effects on employer liability, see
infra notes 12148 and accompanying text.
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2. Judicial Interpretation of the ECPA: Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Service
One commentator has recently noted that the ECPA "is ambiguous
and has not yet been clarified through case law."88 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, addressed the privacy issue
concerning stored electronic communications under the ECPA in Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serice.89 The Fifth Circuit sought
to determine whether the federal government intercepted e-mail commu-
nications stored on a private e-mail system in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511 (1) (a) under Title I of the ECPA.90 The court held that the United
States Secret Service did not intercept the stored e-mail in violation of
Title I, but that the Secret Service did unlawfully access the stored e-mail
88. Connie L. Michaels, Employment Law Considerations, Stress Management, and
Elimination of Bias: The Risk Management Perspective, in CONDUCTING EMPLOYEE IN-
VESTIGATIONS: LEGAL PARAMETERS AND PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS: 1996, at 289 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 555, 1996).
89. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
90. See id. at 460. Steve Jackson Games, Inc., the appellant, operated an elec-
tronic bulletin board system ("BBS") to disseminate information to the public
about its publishing business. See id. at 458. In addition, the appellant provided a
private e-mail service to its 365 BBS users. See id. The court noted: "Private E-mail
was stored on the BBS computer's hard disk drive temporarily, until the addressees
'called' the BBS (using their computers and modems) and read their mail. After
reading their E-mail, the recipients could choose to either store it on the BBS
computer's hard drive or delete it." Id. In March 1990, the United States Secret
Service executed a warrant to search the appellant's premises for alleged evidence
relating to an "unauthorized duplication and distribution of a computerized text
file, containing information about [the Bell Company's] emergency call system."
Id. at 458-59. The search warrant authorized the seizure of the following:
Computer hardware . . . and computer software . . . and ... documents
relating to the use of the computer system . . . and financial documents
and licensing documentation relative to the computer programs and
equipment at ... [Steven Jackson Games, Inc.] . . . which constitute evi-
dence . . . of federal crimes .... This warrant is for the seizure of the
above described computer and computer data and for the authorization
to read information stored and contained on the above described com-
puter and computer data.
Id. at 459 (alterations in original). Pursuant to this search, the Secret Service con-
fiscated, and later read and deleted, "162 items of unread, private E-mail... stored
on the BBS." Id.
The appellant filed suit in federal court against the Secret Service and the
United States under the Federal Wiretap Act and the ECPA. See id. The district
court found for the appellant, holding that the Secret Service unlawfully seized the
stored e-mail communications in violation of the ECPA. See id. The court awarded
each user of the appellant's system $1000 for statutory damages under Title II of
the ECPA, $195,000 for attorneys' fees and $57,000 in costs. See id. Although the
court found for the appellant, it also held that the Secret Service did not intercept
the e-mail communications in violation of Tide I of the ECPA because the acquisi-
tion "was not contemporaneous with the transmission of those communications."
Id. at 459-60. The Secret Service did not appeal the court's ruling, but the appel-
lant challenged the decision, seeking the recovery of a greater damage award
under Tide I. See id. at 462-63.
1028 [Vol. 42: p. 1011
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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a) (1) under Title 11.91 In reaching its
decision, the Fifth Circuit stated that stored electronic communications,
such as e-mail, could not be intercepted for purposes of protection under
Title I of the ECPA.92 The court concluded that access to stored elec-
tronic communications is governed solely by Title II of the ECPA.
93
IV. RECENT CASE LAW INVOLVING E-MAIL PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE
Because of the relatively recent widespread introduction of e-mail sys-
tems into the workplace, few cases exist involving an employee's right to
privacy concerning e-mail communications. In 1996, two federal district
courts and one state court addressed the issue of e-mail privacy in the
employment context.
94
91. See id. at 461-64. The appellant sought to distinguish its case from a case
in which the Fifth Circuit defined an intercept under § 2511 to require "'participa-
tion by the one charged with an 'interception' in the contemporaneous acquisi-
tion of the communication through the use of the device.'" Steve Jackson Games, 36
F.3d at 460 (quoting United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976)). The
appellant claimed that, regardless of the Turk holding, an intercept still occurred
because the Secret Service acquired the e-mail prior to its delivery and also pre-
vented its delivery. See id. Conversely, the government argued the district court
had correctly concluded that Tide II of the ECPA governed the access of stored e-
mail communications, not Title I. Id. at 461.
92. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62. The court quickly rejected the
appellant's argument distinguishing Turk, and instead relied primarily upon the
language of Titles I and II of the ECPA. See id. at 461. The court noted that Tide I
defines electronic communication to specifically exclude "'electronic storage of
such communications.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994)). From this
statutory language, the court concluded that the "[e]-mail in issue was in 'elec-
tronic storage'" and was therefore governed by Title II of the ECPA. Id. In addi-
tion, the Fifth Circuit stated that the ECPA's legislative history supported its
finding that stored e-mail communications could not be intercepted. See id. at 462.
93. See id. at 462-63. The Fifth Circuit further distinguished between Title I
and Title II when it held that there was "no indication in either the [ECPA] or its
legislative history that Congress intended for conduct that is clearly prohibited by
Tide II to furnish the basis for a civil remedy under Title 1." Id. First, the court
noted that a court order is required for the intercept of an electronic communica-
tion while only a warrant is required to access electronic communications stored
for fewer than 180 days. See id. at 463. Second, the court stated that the require-
ments of the court order authorizing the intercept of electronic communications
governing minimization, duration and the types of crimes that may be investigated
do not apply to the access of stored electronic communications. See id. Third, the
court recognized that a court order governing the intercept of electronic commu-
nications must include "strict requirements as to duration," but "[t ] here is no such
requirement for access to stored communications." Id. Fourth, the court noted
that Title II contains no limitations as to the types of crimes to be investigated
during the access of stored communications, such as those crimes that limit the
applicability of a lawful intercept under Title I of the ECPA. See id. In addition,
the court concluded that stored electronic communications are treated differently
than stored wire communications because "[a ] ccess to stored electronic communi-
cations may be obtained pursuant to a search warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 2703; but, access
to stored wire communications requires a court order pursuant to § 2518." Id. at
464.
94. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234-35 (D. Nev. 1996) (hold-
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The United States District Court for the District of Nevada decided
the most recent employment e-mail privacy case in Bohach v. City of Reno.9 5
In Bohach, the plaintiffs, two Reno, Nevada police officers, claimed that the
City of Reno had violated the federal wiretapping statutes and their consti-
tutional right to privacy when it (1) stored messages sent over an "Al-
phapage" message system 96 and (2) accessed the stored messages from
police department computer files. 9 7
ing that plaintiffs suffered no constitutional injury under Fourth Amendment or
under federal wire tapping statutes when their employer accessed their e-mail
messages); Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding
employee had no wrongful discharge claim when employer accessed employee's
work-related e-mail communications); Restuccia v. Burk Tech. Inc., No. 95-2125
(Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (reversing summary judgment for employer and allowing
employees to bring claims against employer who discharged them after reading
their e-mail), reprinted in The Week's Opinions; Superior Court, Massachusetts Lawyers
Weekly, Dec. 16, 1996, at 16.
95. 932 F. Supp. 1232 (D. Nev. 1996).
96. See id. at 1233. The Reno Police Department installed the "Alphapage"
system to "allow the broadcast of 'mini news releases' and other 'timely informa-
tion' to the media by means of... pagers... and thus free up the Department's
regular telephone lines." Id. at 1234. Alphapage was a computer software pro-
gram designed to transmit short alphanumeric messages or voice messages to vis-
ual display pagers from either a telephone, a stand-alone keyboard or a Local Area
Network (LAN) computer. See id. at 1233-34. The present case involved solely the
transmission of alphanumeric messages from a LAN computer to a recipient's
pager. See id. at 1234. The district court described the technical operation of such
transmission as follows:
The user logs on to any Reno Police Department computer terminal and
selects Alphapage from the menu of available functions, and then selects,
from a list of all persons to whom pagers have been issued [including the
press and police personnel], the name of the person to whom the
message is to be sent. The user then types the message and hits the
"send" key. The message is sent to the computer system's "Inforad
Message Directory," where it is stored in a server file, and the user re-
ceives a message on the computer screen indicating that the page is being
processed. The computer then dials the commercial paging company,
sends the message to the company by modem, and disconnects. The user
receives a "page sent" message on the computer screen, and the paging
company takes over, sending the message to the recipient pager by radio
broadcast.
Id. The court later stated in its discussion that it considered an Alphapage message
to be "essentially electronic mail." Id.
97. See id. at 1233. The Reno Police Department had initiated an internal
affairs investigation against the two plaintiffs based upon Alphapage messages sent
to each other in early 1996. See id. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the City
of Reno in an effort to end the investigation and prevent the disclosure of the
Alphapage messages. See id. The district court initially issued a temporary re-
straining order barring the disclosure of the messages. See id. After conducting a
hearing, the district court dissolved the restraining order and denied the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction. See id. In response, the plaintiffs filed an
interlocutory appeal, and sought to suspend the court's injunction pending the
resolution of the appeal under Rule 62(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See id. The court stated that such a request would prevent the police department
from conducting an internal affairs investigation. See id. Because of this effective
"interference by a federal court in the internal operations of a state or local gov-
1030
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First, the district court held that the plaintiffs suffered no constitu-
tional injury under the Fourth Amendment because they had no reason-
able expectation of privacy when using the Alphapage message system. 98
The court noted that any subjective expectation of privacy was unreasona-
ble because (1) the police department notified all Alphapage users that
their messages would be stored on the network; (2) the department pro-
hibited certain types of messages from being broadcast via Alphapage and
(3) the Alphapage system was easily accessible to anyone with access to the
department's computer system.9
9
Second, the district court held that the plaintiffs did not have a claim
under federal wiretapping statutes because no interception of electronic
communications occurred, and the city, as the provider of computer ser-
vice under the ECPA, could lawfully access any stored electronic commu-
nication on its Alphapage system. 10 0 The district court denied the
plaintiffs' motion to prevent access to the stored Alphapage messages. 1 1
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania addressed an employee's e-mail privacy rights in Smyth v. Pillsbury
Co.10 2 In Pillsbury, the district court sought to determine whether an em-
ployee had a claim for wrongful discharge against the Pillsbury Company
emnment," the court provided Reno with the opportunity to respond to the plain-
tiffs' Rule 62(c) motion. Id.
98. See id. at 1234. The court determined that the plaintiffs did have a subjec-
tive expectation of privacy because "had they thought otherwise, they would [not]
have sent over the system the sorts of messages they did send." Id.
99. See id. at 1235. The court further explained that no one in the police
department intentionally tapped the message system because the Alphapage
software itself was designed to record and store messages. See id. at 1234. In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs attempted to liken their communications to private telephone
calls. See id. at 1235. The court noted, however, that for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses, such telephone recordings were permissible because they were part of the
"'ordinary course of business' for police departments." Id. The court distin-
guished the Alphapage system from a telephone by stating that "the system is not
designed to communicate with the public generally" and only a person with an
Alphapage pager can receive messages. See id. The court concluded that "one
should expect, when using [Alphapage], less privacy than one might expect when
•.. making a private telephone call, even from a police station." Id.
100. See id. at 1236. The court noted that federal statutes distinguish between
the interception of electronic communications and the. retrieval of stored elec-
tronic communications. See id. at 1235-36. Additionally, the court stated that once
an electronic communication is stored, it cannot be intercepted; therefore, such a
claim must be decided under Title II of the ECPA and not Title I. See id. at 1236.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have a valid claim against the city
for the unlawful access of stored electronic communications because 18 U.S.C.
§ 2701 (c) (1) "allows service providers to do as they wish when it comes to acces-
sing communications in electronic storage." Id.
101. See id. at 1237. The court additionally stated that the "court's prior order
• . . enjoining the City's actions pending further ORDER of this court, is VA-
CATED, and the City is free to proceed." Id. (citation omitted). For a further
discussion of Bohach, see Bernard Mower, Privacy Rights: Search of Computerized
Messages Held Outside of Worker Privacy Rights, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 2, 1996, at 149.
102. 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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after Pillsbury accessed the employee's work-related e-mail communica-
tions.10 3 The plaintiff relied upon Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc. 10 4 to sup-
port its proposition that a tortious invasion of privacy may be a sufficiently
clear mandate of public policy to bar an at-will employment discharge. 10 5
The district court noted, however, that the Borse decision supported such a
proposition only if an employer's invasion of privacy was "substantial and
... highly offensive to the 'ordinary reasonable person."' Applying this
standard, the court first determined that the plaintiff did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the workplace e-mail communica-
tions. 10 6 Second, the court concluded that no reasonable person would
103. Id. at 98. Pillsbury provided an e-mail service to its employees "in order
to promote internal corporate communications between its employees." Id. Ac-
cording to the plaintiff's complaint, Pillsbury led its employees to believe that all e-
mail communications were privileged and confidential. See id. In addition, Pills-
bury stated that it would not intercept an employee's e-mail communications or
use intercepted e-mail against employees as a grounds for dismissal. See id. In
October 1994, the plaintiff's Pillsbury supervisor sent e-mail to the plaintiff on
Pillsbury's e-mail system. See id. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he re-
plied to his supervisor's communications in reliance on Pillsbury's assurances re-
garding e-mail privacy. See id. Subsequently, Pillsbury "intercepted" these "private
e-mail messages" from the plaintiff to his supervisor. Id. In January 1995, Pillsbury
terminated the plaintiffs employment for sending "inappropriate and unprofes-
sional comments" on its e-mail system. See id. at 98-99.
The plaintiff filed a diversity action in federal court against Pillsbury for
wrongful discharge. See id. at 98. Pillsbury moved to dismiss the plaintiffs action
under Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure alleging the plaintiff
had failed to state a claim for which relief could granted. See id. Pillsbury con-
tended in its motion that the e-mail communications "concerned sales manage-
ment and contained threats to 'kill the backstabbing bastards' and referred to the
planned Holiday party as the 'Jim Jones Koolaid affair.'" Id. at 98 n.1.
104. 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992).
105. See Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. at 100. In relying upon Borse, the plaintiff
sought to establish that the Third Circuit would consider the tortious invasion of
privacy to definitively violate a clear mandate of Pennsylvania's public policy. See
id. Pennsylvania is an at-will employment jurisdiction and, therefore, its law does
not provide a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee. See
id. at 99. Under the at-will employment doctrine, an employer may fire an at-will
employee "'with or without cause, at pleasure"' unless the termination "threatens
or violates a clear mandate of public policy." Id. (quoting Henry v. Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R. Co., 21 A. 157, 157 (1891)). The court additionally noted that the
clear mandate of public policy must "'strike[ ] at the heart of a citizen's social
right, duties, and responsibilities.'" Id. (quoting Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co.,
721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983)).
106. See id. at 101. The court distinguished the present privacy intrusion from
those in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, namely urinalysis
and personal property searches. See id. In addition, the court further differenti-
ated this case because the Pillsbury executives did not require the plaintiff to dis-
close any personal information, as would have been the case in the urinalysis and
personal property search cases. See id. The court determined that the e-mail com-
munications did not enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy even though Pills-
bury had made assurances to its employees that employee e-mail would not be
intercepted. See id. Once the plaintiff voluntarily transmitted the communication
to another individual, his supervisor, the court concluded that "any reasonable
expectation of privacy was lost." Id.
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find Pillsbury's actions to be a substantial and highly offensive invasion of
an employee's privacy interests. 10 7 The district court, therefore, granted
Pillsbury's motion to dismiss.
108
At the state level, a Massachusetts appellate court ruled on a trial
court's grant of a summary judgment motion in favor of the employer in
Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc.'0 9 In Restuccia, an employer discharged
two employees after reading their e-mail messages stored in the em-
ployer's back-up computer files.1 10 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the employer on most counts, including violations of the state
wiretap law, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations, wrongful termination, invasion of privacy,
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. 1 11 The
superior court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in regards to
four of the above mentioned causes of action: wrongful termination, inva-
sion of privacy, negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of
consortium."l
2
First, the court held that the employer's access to back-up computer
files did not constitute an unlawful interception under the state wiretap
laws." l 3 Second, the court dismissed the intentional infliction of emo-
A Pillsbury senior executive refuted Smyth's claim that Pillsbury assured its
employees of privacy on the Pillsbury computer system. See Letters to Fortune, FOR-
TUNE, Mar. 17, 1997, at 21-22. DeOcejo asserted that the district court's opinion
relied solely upon Smyth's contentions when it stated that Pillsbury assured Smyth
that his e-mail would remain private. See id. DeOcejo claimed that had the case
gone to trial, Pillsbury would have offered a signed waiver that showed Smyth con-
sented to e-mail monitoring. Id. This evidence would have shown that "Smyth
acknowledged the company's right to review E-mail, and he signed the authoriza-
tion well in advance of his difficulties with [Pillsbury]." /d. For a further discus-
sion of the consent defense to e-mail privacy invasion, see supra notes 85-87 and
accompanying text.
107. See Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. at 101. The court determined that Pillsbury's
interest in "preventing inappropriate and unprofessional comments or even illegal
activity over its e-mail system outweighs any privacy interest the employee may
have." Id. In addition, under the second reason for dismissal, the court once
again noted that Pillsbury did not force the plaintiff to disclose personal informa-
tion or invade the plaintiffs person, as would be the case with urinalysis or a per-
sonal property search. See id.
108. See id.
109. No. 95-2125 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), reprinted in The Week's Opinions; Supe-
rior Court, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Dec. 16, 1996, at 16.
110. Id. The employees' stored e-mail messages included messages contain-
ing nicknames for the employer and messages detailing the employer's extramari-
tal affair with another employee. See id.
111. See id. One of the plaintiffs' spouses joined the suit as a co-plaintiff for
the loss of consortium claim. See id.
112. See id. The court held that the employer was entitled to summary judg-
ment on the claims under the state wiretap statute- intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress and tortious interference with contractual relations. See id.
113. See id. The Massachusetts statute included a business exception to inter-
ception laws which stated that "'[i] t shall not be a violation of this section ... for
persons to possess an office intercommunication system which is used in the ordi-
1997] COMMENT 1033
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tional distress claim because the employees did not meet their burden of
proving extreme and outrageous conduct by the employer or severe emo-
tional distress. 114 Third, the court allowed the continuance of the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress claim because the employees met
their initial burden of alleging emotional distress resulting in physical
harm. 115 Fourth, the court dismissed the employees' tortious interference
with contractual relations claim because they did not allege an actual or
prospective third-party contract. 1 16 Fifth, the court held that summary
judgment was not appropriate for the invasion of privacy claim because
two genuine issues of material fact remained: whether the employees had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail messages and whether
the employer's actions were "an unreasonable, substantial or serious inter-
ference with [their] privacy."' 1 7 Sixth, the court similarly held that sum-
mary judgment was not appropriate for the wrongful discharge claim
because genuine issues of material fact existed for the invasion of privacy
issues.1 18 Finally, the court held that an employee's spouse had sufficient
facts set forth in the complaint to allege a loss of consortium claim. 1 19
At first, the Restuccia decision appears to be a pro-employee decision.
The court, however, was only deciding whether summary judgment was
proper in light of the allegations of the complaint. 120 Nevertheless, the
plaintiff still faces serious obstacles at the trial level.
nary course of their business or to use such office intercommunication system in
their ordinary course of their business.'" MAss. GEN. LAws. Ch. 272, § 99 (1997).
The court held that reading files that the system automatically backed up was a
protected interception under the ordinary course of business exception. See id.
114. See No. 95-2125 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), reprinted in The Week's Opinions;
Superior Court, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Dec. 16, 1996, at 16. The court stated
that the plaintiffs' burden was to show that the "defendants intentionally caused
severe emotional distress through conduct that was extreme and outrageous." Id.
115. See id. The court stated that such harm "must be manifested by objective
symptomatology and substantiated by expert medical testimony." Id. One plaintiff
claimed that she experienced sleeplessness, stomach aches and headaches and suf-
fered a miscarriage. See id. The other plaintiff claimed that he experienced sleep-
lessness, gastrointestinal difficulties and fatigue as a result of the employer's
actions. See id.
116. See id. The court stated that "[t]o succeed on a claim of interference
with contractual relations, plaintiffs must prove that they had a contract with a
third party, that the defendant knowingly and improperly induced the third party
to break that contract and that plaintiffs were harmed by defendants' actions.". Id.
117. Id. The court stated that under Massachusetts law, "a person shall have a
right against unreasonable, substantial, or serious interference with his privacy."
Id.
118. See id. The court stated that an employer may not discharge an at-will
employee if the employer's reason violates a "clearly defined and well established
public policy." Id. The employees based the wrongful discharge claim on the no-
tion that an invasion of privacy is contrary to a "clearly defined and well established
public policy." Id.
119. See id. Under Massachusetts common law, a spouse may recover "dam-
ages arising from personal injury of the other spouse caused by the negligence of a
third person." Id.
120. See id.
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V. E-MAIL POLICIES IN THE WORKPLACE
Current law does not vest a strong privacy interest in an employee for
e-mail in the workplace.1 21 An employer, however, may provide employ-
ees with advance knowledge of how e-mail will be treated in their employ-
ment context by creating an e-mail monitoring policy. 122 Such a policy
should clearly communicate to employees the employer's intentions re-
garding workplace privacy. 123 Furthermore, a well-disseminated e-mail
policy could be an effective method to avoid invasion of privacy claims or
complaints by employees. 124 Currently, it is estimated that only one-third
of U.S. businesses utilizing e-mail systems have e-mail policies. 125 E-mail
monitoring policies serve multiple purposes. They create clear standards
to prevent employment disputes and insure consistent supervisory admin-
istration of employment relations.126 As one commentator noted: " [M] ost
importantly, they can make employees feel that the company subscribes to
a philosophy of fairness and equal treatment in employment matters.
1 27
In addition, an e-mail monitoring policy will provide proof to the em-
121. See Hash & Ibrahim, supra note 68, at 909 ("It appears that current fed-
eral law, as well as state statutory and common law, favors employers when it comes
to E-mail monitoring in the workplace."); Van Doren, supra note 19, at 12 ("Secur-
ity measures such as assigning personal identification codes to employees and se-
cret passwords to access specific networks reinforce the employees' belief that e-
mail messages belong solely to the sender and the parties to whom the messages
are sent."). For a further discussion of an employee's lack of privacy interest in
workplace e-mail, see supra notes 35-93 and accompanying text.
122. See Glassberg et al., supra note 15, at 75 ("Employees can and will use E-
mail for idle chitchat, gossip, and privileged or derogatory conversation when
there is no policy suggesting its appropriate use.").
123. See Lee, supra note 68, at 469 (noting need to communicate company's
expectations).
124. See Lorek, supra note 19, at 4G ("It's important for employers to have e-
mail policies in place to prevent potential litigation."); Van Doren, supra note 19,
at 12 ("[E] mployers can both avoid potential legal problems and ensure their right
to monitor e-mail messages by implementing and communicating e-mail monitor-
ing policies to their employees."); see also PERRITr, supra note 45, at 220 ("As a
general matter, an employee can consent to conduct that would constitute an inva-
sion of privacy absent the consent."). See generally Employers Stepping Up, supra note
28 (quoting Hal Coxson, management lawyer, as stating "I think employers should
be up front with their employees about monitoring in the workplace. I think com-
panies should have very explicit written policies that employees are aware of which
inform them that they will be subject to monitoring for legitimate business
purposes.").
125. See Brown, supra note 30, at 66. One group of commentators have sug-
gested that an effective e-mail policy must "[b] e consistent with the policies regard-
ing other communication media," "[c]onsider the rights and expectations of
employees," "[e]ndeavor to protect employers' rights," "[b]e drafted by a cross-
functional team composed of management, informations systems, legal, and
human resource personnel" and "[b] e written and well communicated throughout
the organization." Glassberg et al., supra note 15, at 74 fig.2.
126. See CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. & JOEL M. GRossmAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 48 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that policies make employ-
ees feel that there is sense of fairness within company).
127. Id.
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ployee, or to a court in the event of litigation, that the employer seeks to
protect company property and resources, and does not seek to invade the
employee's privacy rights.1 2
8
Prior to adopting an e-mail monitoring policy or manual, an em-
ployer should decide how binding they want their policy statement to
be. 129 A majority of courts currently hold that an employer is contractu-
ally bound by the terms of employment manuals and policies. 130 These
courts hold that unilateral contacts are formed between the employer and
employee: the offer is the policy statement and the employee accepts by
starting or continuing to work for the employer. 3 1 The argument for
contractual validity is further strengthened because the employer volunta-
rily issues such policies.' 3 2 A minority of courts, however, hold that poli-
cies or manuals are merely "unilateral expressions which can be followed
or not at the employer's discretion."'
33
To avoid a dispute as to whether the policy or manual is binding, the
employer should "clearly and prominently" state that the policy or manual
does not grant the employee contractual rights. 134 Additionally, for moni-
toring consent purposes, the employer should adhere strictly to monitor-
ing detailed in the e-mail monitoring policy. 13 5 One commentator has
128. See Gantt, supra note 66, at 358 ("[T)he policies serve as evidence... [of
the company's] desire to protect its property.").
129. See BAALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 126, at 57 (stating that intent of par-
ties, as evidenced through language used, is often controlling).
130. See id. at 48.
131. See id. at 50.
132. See id. at 51 (noting that employer has no obligation to issue such pol-
icy). One state court has moved away from the strict application of contract offer
and acceptance and held that an employer may unilaterally amend the policy with-
out notice to the employee. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (Mich. 1980). Commentators have stated that the Michigan court upheld
the continued validity of the policy "even if there is no evidence that the parties
reached any agreement regarding the policy." BAKALY &'GROSSMAN, supa note
126, at 51.
133. BA ALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 126, at 48. For a further discussion of
the rationale of the courts holding manuals and policies to be unilateral expres-
sion by the employer, see id. at 52-54. In addition, a few courts have not directly
decided whether an employer's policy or manual is contractually binding. See id. at
48.
134. See id. at 57 ("[A]n employer should ... assume that any procedures or
guidelines adopted as a matter of 'policy' will be enforced against it unless it
clearly and prominently states that its policies do not grant the employee any con-
tractual rights."). Courts are likely to nullify such a "disclaimer" if the employer
acts in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the policy or manual, even if the
disclaimer is otherwise sufficiently clear to be given effect. See id. at 60.
135. See Baumhart, supra note 41, at 934 ("[A]n employer who intends to ob-
tain employee consent by announcing a monitoring policy must be careful to oper-
ate within the confines of the policy."); Gantt, supra note 66, at 356 (discussing
preeminent consent defense case, Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577 (11th
Cir. 1983), which held that "employee consent will be carefully limited to the con-
fines of an employer monitoring policy"). For a further discussion of employee
consent to e-mail monitoring, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. In
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suggested that if an employer prefers engaging in extensive monitoring of
employee e-mail, he or she should "expand the permissible scope [of
monitoring] by offering legitimate interests justifying broad monitoring
policies."
1 36
In addition to explaining that e-mail is to facilitate business communi-
cations, an e-mail monitoring policy should include three main provisions:
the employer's right to access e-mail provision, the personal use provision
and the forbidden content provision.' 3 7 First, the employer's right to ac-
cess provision should state that the employer reserves the right to access
any of the employees' e-mail messages transmitted on the employer's sys-
tem.1 3 8 Second, the personal use provision should inform the employee
to what extent the company's e-mail system may be used for personal use,
Watkins, the employer's monitoring policy for telephone calls allowed the em-
ployer to monitor business-related conversation and to monitor personal tele-
phone conversations to the extent necessary to determine whether the call was for
business or personal purposes. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 579. In regards to the em-
ployer monitoring an entire personal conversation of an employee, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the employer's policy
limited the employee's consent for full conversation monitoring to only business-
related calls, and the full conversation monitoring of a personal conversation vio-
lated 18 U.S.C. § 2511. See id. at 581-82.
136. Gantt, supra note 66, at 358.
137. SeeA Sample E-Mail Policy, CONN. L. TRIu., Dec. 18, 1995, at 12 (discussing
sample e-mail policy developed by labor, employment and employee benefits
group).
138. See id. The following is an excerpt from a sample e-mail policy drafted by
Margaret Hart Edwards, an attorney from the San Francisco- and Sacramento-
based law firm of Landels, Riley & Diamond:
Management's Right to Access Information
The electronic mail system has been installed by XYZ to facilitate
business communications. Although such employee has an individual
password to access this system, it belongs to the Company and the con-
tents of e-mail communications are accessible at all times by XYZ manage-
ment for any business purpose. These systems may be subject to periodic
unannounced inspections, and should be treated like other shared filing
systems. All system passwords and encryption keys must be available to
Company management, and you may not use passwords that are un-
known to your supervisor or install encryption programs without turning
over encryption keys to your supervisor.
All e-mail messages are Company records. The contents of e-mail
properly obtained for legitimate business purposes, may be disclosed
within the Company without your permission. Therefore, you should not
assume that messages are confidential. Back-up copies of e-mail may be
maintained and referenced for business and legal reasons.
Id.; see also Phillip Rosen & Margaret Bryant, Draft a Policy Before You Monitor Email,
HR REP., June 1996, at 3 (suggesting that e-mail monitoring policies should in-
clude provision stating "[e]-mail may be monitored for legitimate purposes with-
out prior notice to protect confidential information, prevent theft or abuse of the
system, or monitor work flow and productivity"). Such a provision could also in-
clude information dealing with "how often the system is monitored, by whom and
specify the purpose of the monitoring." Mattson, supra note 18, at 16.
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if personal use is to be allowed at all. 139 If, however, an employer allows
personal use-e-mail, he or she should be careful to not discriminatorily
prohibit certain types of employee e-mail, such as prohibiting pro-union
messages. 140 Third, the forbidden content provision should inform the
employee that certain types of e-mail content are strictly forbidden, such
as sexually explicit or racially offensive messages.1 41 By including the
139. See A Sample E-Mail Policy, supra note 137, at 12. The following is the
personal use provision of Ms. Edwards' sample e-mail policy:
Personal Use of E-Mail
Because XYZ provides the electronic mail system to assist you in the
performance of your job, you should use it for official Company business.
Incidental and occasional personal use of e-mail is permitted by XYZ, but
these messages will be treated the same as other messages. XYZ reserves
the right to access and disclose as necessary all messages sent over its e-
mail system, without regard to content.
Since your personal messages can be accessed by XYZ management
without prior notice, you should not use e-mail to transmit any messages
you would not want read by a third party. For example, you should not
use the XYZ e-mail for gossip, including personal information about your-
self or others, for forwarding messages under circumstances likely to em-
barrass the sender, or for emotional responses to business
correspondence or work situations. In any event, you should not use
these systems for such purposes as soliciting or proselytizing for commer-
cial ventures, religious or personal causes or outside organizations or
other similar, nonjob-related solicitations. If XYZ discovers that you are
misusing the e-mail system, you will be subject to disciplinary action up to
and including termination.
Id.
140. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. ("DuPont") allowed its employees to distribute personal e-
mail communications over its computer system. See id. at 919. In light of DuPont's
then existing policy, an administrative law judge from the National Labor Rela-
tions Board ruled that DuPont could not prevent union employees from distribut-
ing union information in e-mail communications. See id. One commentator
noted: "Although ... whether unions have the right to use E-mail systems is still
unsettled, the .. .lesson from DuPont is clear. If a corporation knowingly allows its
employees to use E-mail for personal purposes, the company will be hard pressed to justify a
ban on pro-union messages." Morris et al., supra note 42, at 345 (emphasis added).
141. See A Sample E-Mail Policy, supra note 137, at 12. The following is the
forbidden content provision of Ms. Edwards' sample e-mail policy:
Forbidden Content of E-Mail Communications
You may not use XYZ's e-mail system in any way that may be seen as
insulting, disruptive, or offensive by other persons, or harmful to morale.
Examples of forbidden transmissions include sexually-explicit messages,
cartoons, or jokes; unwelcome propositions or love letters; ethnic or ra-
cial slurs; or any other message that can be construed to be harassment or
disparagement of others based on their sex, race, sexual orientation, age,
national origin, or religious or political beliefs.
Use of the Company-provided e-mail system in violation of this
guideline will result in disciplinary action, up to and including
termination.
Id. Furthermore, one commentator has suggested that at a minimum, all e-mail
policies should forbid the following types of messages: "racial or ethnic slurs," "sex-
ual harassment," "distribution of corporate trade secrets" and "distribution of
third-party copyrighted materials." Wasch, supra note 7, at 13. Furthermore, Patri-
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above provisions in an e-mail monitoring policy, the employer lowers the
employee's expectations of privacy in workplace e-mail communications
and weakens the employee's privacy invasion allegations. 142
One of the most important steps in instituting an effective e-mail pol-
icy in a workplace is informing the employees as to its content. 143 When
an employer adequately disseminates the contents of an e-mail policy, he
or she has a greater level of protection in the event of litigation because
cia L. Morris, the Dean of the School of Education and Urban Studies at Morgan
State University, suggests that it is important to caution same-race, same-ethnic, or
same-gender employees from sending e-mail "jokes" pertaining to their own race,
ethnicity or gender because such jokes "reinforce stereotypes." Singletary, supra
note 24, at Al. For a discussion of the Morgan Stanley and Citibank lawsuits in-
volving racially offensive e-mail messages, see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying
text.
In addition, Ms. Edwards included a provision within her sample e-mail policy
discussing e-mail encryption, entitled "Password and Encryption Key Security and
Integrity," which stated: "Employees are prohibited from the unauthorized use of
passwords and encryption keys of other employees to gain access to the other em-
ployee's e-mail messages." A Sample E-Mail Policy, supra note 137, at 12.
142. See Daniel W. McDonald et al., Intellectual Property and Privacy Issues on the
Internet, 79J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 31, 56 (1997) (advising that employers
"take precautionary steps" monitoring employee e-mail communications because
"there is little case law . . . to provide definitive guidance as to liability"). One
commentator has suggested the benefits of an e-mail monitoring policy that lowers
the employee's expectation of privacy:
An employer should develop a policy that effectively lowers the expecta-
tion of privacy in advance, present it to the employees in writing and
through training programs including, if possible, actual demonstrations.
This will greatly improve an employer's chances of tipping the privacy
balance in its favor in future litigation challenging the surveillance or
monitoring. The lower the expectation of privacy on the part of the em-
ployee, the greater the likelihood that searches and monitoring will be
held valid. The bottom line is that the employer should do everything it
reasonably can, consistent with its culture and employee morale, to lower
the privacy expectations of employees.
Lee, supra note 68, at 470.
143. See Emily Leinfuss, Policy over Policing; It's Easy to Develop E-Mail and In-
ternet Policies, but Education and Documentation Are Crucial to Their Success, IN-
FOWORLD, Aug. 19, 1996, at 55 ("Companies have a responsibility to post policies.
They should be embedded in written documentation and 'advertised' in a banner
on company systems.") (quoting Richard Power). Some suggested methods for
employers to communicate e-mail policies to employees include providing all new
employees with a written version of the policy, having an informational message
appear each time an employee logs on to the company system, seeking acknowl-
edgment through signature forms and providing notification to employees when
the employee receives new computer hardware or software. See Van Doren, supra
note 19, at 12; see also Rosen & Bryant, supra note 138, at 3 ("Program a notice
repeating ... the policy. Install it to appear on the computer screen whenever
someone logs on to the email system."); Leinfuss, supra, at 55 (stating that some
employers recommunicate e-mail policies in company's bimonthly newsletters).
For example, the Minneapolis office of Deloitte & Touche provides employees
with a written e-mail policy and it requires employees to sign an acknowledgment
form which states "that they have read the policy and consent to having [their]
communication monitored." Mattson, supra note 18, at 16.
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the employee cannot claim they were unaware of the employer's policy.1 4 4
The employee's awareness of the monitoring also satisfies the consent re-
quirements under the Stored Communications Act, thereby protecting the
employer from potential liability.145 In addition, employees are more
likely to believe that e-mail monitoring is an acceptable practice if they are
informed about the employer's policy.146 Along with creating and com-
municating the e-mail policy, the employer should also explain to the em-
ployee the dangers associated with e-mail communications in the
workplace. 14 7 For example, the employer should explain to its employees
the effects of an e-mail message on the litigation process. 1 48
VI. CONCLUSION
Generally, employees in the private sector should expect little, if no,
legal privacy interest in the e-mail that they send or receive from work-
place computers. 149 Under current federal statutory enactments and state
common law, an employer has a right to monitor and access employee e-
mail sent and received from company computer systems. 150 A member of
the United States Senate has unsuccessfully sought to require employers to
notify employees if the employer intends to monitor workplace e-mail
144. See Van Doren, supra note 19, at 12 ("Making sure that the e-mail policy
is clearly communicated to employees provides a level of protection from those
employees who seek legal recourse claiming they were unaware of the practice.").
145. See Mattson, supra note 18, at 16 ("One of the biggest ways that employ-
ers are protecting themselves [from federal and state wiretap laws] is by obtaining
... consent through publication of written e-mail policies."). For a further discus-
sion of the consent defense under federal law, see supra notes 85-87 and accompa-
nying text.
146. See Van Doren, supra note 19, at 12 (reporting that 1993 study found that
"a significantly higher amount of [employee e-mail users] believed that monitor-
ing workplace e-mail was acceptable when the employer had initially informed
them about the monitoring policy").
147. See Parry Aftab, A Carefully Planned E-mail Policy is the Best Defense in a Liti-
gation, N.Y. L.J., July 2, 1996, at 5. An employer should explain to employees two
important points: first, that erased or deleted e-mail may "linger forever in backup
tapes and stored printouts" and second, that their more relaxed e-mail communi-
cations can "lead to misunderstandings and unwarranted liability." Id. Mr. Aftab
suggests that employers should also tell their employees that nothing should ap-
pear in an e-mail message if it should not appear in a memorandum or a letter. See
id.
148. See Michael F. Cavanaugh, E-mail Privacy: A Glass Almost Haf-Ful, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Mar. 18, 1996, at 37. A recent survey conducted by the Society for
Human Resource Management found that only 30% of employers surveyed had
explained to their employees that e-mail messages can be discoverable materials
during the discovery phase of judicial actions. See id.
149. For a further discussion of an employee's lack of privacy interest in work-
place e-mail, see supra notes 35-93 and accompanying text.
150. For a further discussion of current federal statutory enactments and state
common law that allow access to employee e-mail accounts, see supra notes 45-93
and accompanying text.
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communications.1 5 1 In addition, several state legislatures have debated
whether employers should notify employees of monitoring activity, yet no
pro-employee privacy statute has been enacted.
152
In order to promote and maintain a desirable workplace environ-
ment, employers should seek to create an acceptable balance between the
need to monitor workplace e-mail communications and the legitimate pri-
vacy concerns of its employees.' 53 One commentator suggests that em-
ployers should only monitor employee e-mail for administrative necessity
or to protect some justifiable legal interest. 154 Furthermore, employment
attorneys are now recommending to their clients that they should limit
workplace e-mail monitoring.' 55 As e-mail use continues to increase, em-
ployers should adopt a formal, well-publicized e-mail policy to ensure em-
ployees are aware of their privacy rights in the private-sector workplace.
156
As the influential Warren and Brandeis article proclaimed in 1890, "the
next step ... must be taken [to secure] ... the individual.., the right 'to
151. See Andrea Bernstein, Who's Reading Your E-Mail, NEWSDAY, July 15, 1996,
at A21. Senator Paul Simon introduced legislation to the United States Senate that
would increase employee rights by requiring an employer to notify employees
about electronic monitoring and to communicate to employees how the informa-
tion would be used. See id. Although the Senate has never voted on the proposed
legislation, Senator Simon warned that "rapid advances in office electronic tech-
nology may be outstripping personal privacy rights." Id.
152. See Halloran, supra note 27, at Al. The state legislatures in Washington
and Wisconsin failed to enact proposed legislation that would have limited an em-
ployer's access to e-mail. See id. The Arkansas state legislature failed to enact pro-
posed legislation in 1995 that would have required employers to notify employees
of all personal surveillance of computer e-mail, in addition to camera surveillance
and taping or listening to telephone conversations, that would have occurred in
the workplace. See H.B. 2017, 80th Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1995), summary available in
WESTLAW, BILLS-OLD File. In addition, the Colorado state legislature was re-
cently debating the employer monitoring notification requirements. See Halloran,
supra note 27, at Al.
153. See Peter Danzinger, E-mail Monitoring Can Hurt Morale, THE TIMES UNION
(Albany), Mar. 22, 1997, at D1O (advising that "[m]onitoring can have negative
effects on employees and company morale").
154. See Baumhart, supra note 41, at 947 ("Additionally, employers should re-
view employee E-mail only when administratively essential.... [and] should con-
fine its review to transactional data whenever possible . . ").
155. See Alan Stem, Electronic Mail Raises Thorny Legal Questions, THE DENVER
PosT, Apr. 8, 1996, at C-12 ("[E]mployment lawyers are advising their clients to
monitor their employees' e-mail only for legitimate business purposes .... ."). In
addition, one commentator reported that employment attorneys believe that em-
ployers should seek advance consent from employees before commencing e-mail
monitoring. See id.; see also Baumhart, supra note 41, at 948 ("[T]he cautious em-
ployer should confine its review to transactional data whenever possible, reading
message content only when a narrower search will not accomplish its legitimate or
substantial business purpose.").
156. For a further discussion of the suggested elements of an e-mail monitor-
ing policy and the positive impact of adopting such a policy for private-sector work-
places, see supra notes 121-48 and accompanying text.
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be let alone."" 57 Private-sector employers have begun to address this im-
portant issue and take the "next step"; recent research efforts have con-
cluded that most American companies using e-mail systems in their
workplace are in the process of adopting formal e-mail policies.
158
Kevinj Baum
157. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. For a further discussion of the
Warren and Brandeis article, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
158. See Houlder, supra note 16, at 14 (reporting that e-mail policies "usually
cover legal and security matters, together with guidelines about message style and
the frequency with which messages should be sent"). For a further general discus-
sion of private-sector e-mail monitoring policies, see supra notes 121-48 and accom-
panying text.
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